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Abstract
The pursuit of disarmament was central to the work of the League of Nations throughout its
existence, but it was a relatively small and consistent set of national representatives who sat on
the many bodies created to deal with the issue. Unfortunately, the gradual development of a
sense of ‘transnational’ community among these delegates was never able to overcome the more
powerful imperatives of national self-interest. Disarmament was always tied too closely to the
issue of security for the individual governments of the major powers to view it from anything
other than a strictly national strategic perspective.
Speaking during August 1927 to the Geneva Institute of International Relations, a
‘summer school’ for British and American League of Nations enthusiasts that met
each year from 1926 to 1938, the Spanish director of the disarmament section of the
League Secretariat quipped that ‘we in Geneva are apt to forget the nation whence
we come; we are so busy with the other nations’. Referring to his own particular
area of expertise, Salvador de Madariaga declared that ‘this work of disarmament
is an excellent method of mutual education. The men who come to Geneva to
discuss it are bound to go back to their own countries and to explain to their own
public opinion the complexity of the political problems of the world.’1 It was a
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common hope of the League’s supporters that it might function as an international
institution that transcended the narrow national interests of individual governments.
As an organisation composed of sovereign member states – the sole source of its
authority – the primary purpose for which the League of Nations was created was
to maintain peace through a system of collective security. Yet the expansion of its
influence and responsibility was also driven by the increasing extent to which so many
problems formerly deemed to be solely of national concern were now considered
fit for international discussion. Amid laments for its lack of achievement in the
political arena, commentators still recognised that it was ‘in the sphere of public
health, of the suppression of the traffic in drugs, and of the White Slave Traffic, in
the improvement through suasion of the standards of hygiene and public morals in
the more backward countries, that the League has so far done its least spectacular but
most efficient work’.2 National delegates came to Geneva to consider all these issues
and still others besides; the dream was that, once there, they might look beyond the
strictly national perspective and act as a wider ‘transnational’ community of global
citizens. Particularly during the 1920s there was a widespread belief in a kind of
‘League spirit’ that could infuse the normally cynical or sceptical delegate when he
encountered the heady international air of Geneva. One League supporter insisted
that ‘such an atmosphere unquestionably exists, and there are those who view it with
some misgiving as tending to impel delegates in a moment of enthusiasm to decisions
or agreements which their Governments at home might subsequently decline to
ratify’.3 Sadly, this dream of the power of the ‘League spirit’ went mostly unfulfilled,
as the ideal of transnational co-operation was forever tempered by the realities of
national interest. Another opinion, voiced amid the bleaker mood prevailing in the
early 1930s, put the sensation of the atmosphere in Geneva more carefully, rejecting
descriptions of it as ‘a kind of international revivalism in which statesmen were apt
to lose their sense of realities’. While there was certainly ‘idealism’ in Geneva, it was
of a ‘severely practical kind’.4
This inability to rise above the specific concerns of each nation-state was central
to the League’s failure in perhaps its greatest challenge, the pursuit of international
disarmament, and clearly revealed the limits of the transnational dream. Disarmament
was among the most complex of the political problems of the inter-war world. The
League was bound to the task in 1919 by the peace settlements that followed the
carnage of the First World War. Article 8 of the League Covenant stated that ‘the
maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest
point consistent with national safety’, while the preamble to the arms reductions
clauses of all the peace treaties signed with the defeated powers insisted that their
enforced disarmament was taking place in order ‘to render possible the initiation
2 G. D. H. Cole and Margaret Cole, The Intelligent Man’s Review of Europe Today (London: Gollancz, 1933),
758–9.
3 H. Wilson Harris, What the League of Nations Is, 2nd edn. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1927), 123–4.
4 Harold Laski, editor’s introduction to Problems of Peace: Lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of
International Relations (August 1931), 6th ser. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), v–vi.
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of a general limitation of armaments of all nations’.5 In practice, however, all the
League’s efforts over the next two decades met with only the most limited success
as it failed to achieve either quantitative disarmament, through substantial reductions
in the military forces of states, or qualitative disarmament, through regulation of
the production and use of certain types of weapon. The most prominent forum for
international debate on the subject was the disarmament committee at the annual
League Assembly, known from the 1921 Assembly on as the Third Committee. High-
profile though this committee was, it dealt with disarmament mostly in general terms;
the practicalities of specific proposals were handled elsewhere. Between 1920
and 1925 the League adopted a broadly based approach to the issue, including
attempts to regulate the global arms trade, to limit national military budgets and
to link disarmament to new security regimes. The details of these schemes were
overseen by two contrasting commissions, the solely military Permanent Armaments
Commission (PAC) and the primarily civilian Temporary Mixed Commission on
Armaments (TMC). From 1926 until 1930 a new body known as the Preparatory
Commission for the Disarmament Conference (PCDC), composed of political and
diplomatic delegates, conducted the interminable negotiations to produce a single
draft disarmament treaty covering all nations and all spheres of armaments. Its
years of work, filled with diverse and often contradictory initiatives, led up to the
climax of the inter-war dismament process: the meeting of the mammoth World
Disarmament Conference (WDC), held between February 1932 and June 1934.
While the conference’s lengthy and unproductive deliberations were tedious, its
eventual failure was spectacular, with the high drama of Germany’s simultaneous
withdrawal from the conference and the League itself in October 1933. After its
final collapse some months later, a denouement saw new approaches to disarmament
still being considered almost until the outbreak of another world war, though in a
haphazard and admittedly unenthusiastic fashion. While the primary actors in this
tragedy were always the major states, it is worth reconsidering the place of the League
itself in the disarmament process which it organised, standing as it did as its inimitable
linchpin.6
5 For the peace treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, each of which
incorporated the League Covenant, see The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923, 2 vols. (New York: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1924).
6 The best examination of the inter-war disarmament process is in Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed:
European International History, 1919–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 372–83, 565–97,
755–96. For a more general overview see Andrew Webster, ‘From Versailles to Geneva: The Many
Forms of Inter-war Disarmament’, Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming). That disarmament should
be approached from the perspective of the League, looking outwards from Geneva, seemed natural
to inter-war commentators. However, in keeping with the more negative assessments of the League
that dominated after 1945, most later studies have tended to view disarmament from the perspective
of individual states, with the League itself often almost incidental to the process. For examples of the
former, see John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Information on the Reduction of Armaments (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1925), Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925–1931 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), and
The Pipe Dream of Peace: The Story of the Collapse of Disarmament (New York: W. Morrow, 1935); Arnold
Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1923–38 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925–77); and also
the analysis by a former deputy secretary-general of the League in F. P. Walters, A History of the League
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The task of implementing disarmament drew in representatives from every single
member of the League of Nations, as well as from the most important non-member
states. Significantly, for most of these countries the same people tended to be assigned
to deal with disarmament year after year. As a result, a core of individuals set
themselves apart over time as the main voices and chief experts on disarmament.
There were, of course, innumerable exceptions to this continuity of representation on
the League’s various disarmament bodies – delegates replaced for a year or two due to
changes of political fortune at home, highly influential figures present only for a very
limited number of meetings, experts who were called in only for specific questions,
and so on – but the long-term presence of a significant number of individuals
was remarkable. While some held very high public profiles, many remained almost
unknown outside the committee rooms of Geneva. Chief among them were a core of
delegates from the European states, the most powerful and influential of whom were
always those representing the major powers. For Britain, there was first and foremost
the irrepressible Lord Robert Cecil, a Conservative cabinet minister, one of the
founders of the League itself, and prominent as the president of the largest of all the
national pro-League pressure groups, the League of Nations Union, but there was also
the little-known Rear-Admiral John Segrave. For France, there was the flamboyant
Joseph Paul-Boncour, a socialist minister and president of the ‘study commission’ of
the Conseil Superieur de la Défense Nationale, whose glorious mane of white hair
was so loved by cartoonists, but also the quietly competent René Massigli, head of
the Quai d’Orsay’s Service Française de la Société des Nations, and the penetrating
and energetic soldier Colonel Edouard Réquin. For Italy, there was the senator
Carlo Schanzer, focused on the need for statistical detail, and the ubiquitous General
Alberto de Marinis, first soldier and then senator and a member of almost every
League disarmament committee, who with his large head, short neck and sleepy eyes
had the appearance of ‘a good-natured bullfrog’.7 For Germany, there was the dour,
unforgiving and unflinching Reichstag deputy and former ambassador Count Johann
von Bernstorff. Finally, from the Soviet Union, came the chubby, clever and energetic
deputy commissar of foreign affairs, Maxim Litvinoff. The smaller European states
also provided figures who, often because of their personal prestige, were able to play
important roles in the League’s disarmament process. Two of the most prominent
individuals in this category were the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, the bustling
Edouard Beneš, and the ambassador and sometime Greek foreign minister, the dapper
legal expert Nicolas Politis. The Scandinavian states were perhaps the most forceful
group of all in pressing for action on disarmament. Karl Branting served three terms
as prime minister and represented Sweden each year until his death in 1925, while
of Nations, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). For examples of the latter, see Edward
Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, 1932–1933 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979);
Maurice Vaı̈sse, Sécurité d’abord: la politique française en matière de désarmement, 9 decembre 1930–17 avril
1934 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1981); Christopher Hall, Britain, America and Arms Control,
1921–1937 (London: Macmillan, 1987); Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in
the 1920s (London: Printer, 1989).
7 Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York: Longman, Green, 1941), 252.
The League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920–1938 497
Christian Lange, the secretary-general of the Inter-Parliamentary Union from 1909
to 1934, was an almost constant Norwegian delegate to the League from its founding
until his death in 1938. Largely in recognition of their League work, in particular their
activism in support of disarmament and pacifism, Branting and Lange would share
the 1921 Nobel Peace Prize.8 Other constant presences were the Finnish ambassador
and former foreign minister Eino Rudolf Holsti and the former Danish minister of
defence Peter Munch, along with foreign minister Paul Hymans and senator Louis de
Brouckère from Belgium, sometime president of the Swiss confederation Giuseppe
Motta, and the Dutch foreign minister and later ambassador Jan Loudon, who would
chair the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Finally, there
was a host of less formally distinguished delegates, some of them non-European,
whose almost continual service on the League’s disarmament committees was striking
and occasionally did give them useful influence. These included the permanent
delegates to the League from Austria, Eméric Pflügl, from Poland, François Sokal,
and from Japan, Naotake Sato, along with former under-secretary for finance Eduardo
Cobian and Rear-Admiral Antonio Marques de Magaz from Spain and former prime
minister and foreign minister Augusto de Vasconcellos from Portugal. For the South
American states, ambassador and former prime minister Enrique Villegas from Chile,
ambassador and former foreign minister Francisco José Urrutia from Colombia,
ambassador J. Gustavo Guerrero from El Salvador, and ambassador Enrique Buero
from Uruguay all became familiar faces.
These national delegates arrived at the meetings of the innumerable committees,
commissions and conferences dealing with disarmament bearing instructions to
advance or defend their own state’s respective political, military, economic and
security interests. In the League’s international forum, over the years they steadily
acquired a deeper understanding of the global dimensions of the problem, the various
policy requirements and anxieties of their fellow delegates, and the compromises and
concessions that were needed if success was to be achieved. That this awareness did
not produce a genuine international disarmament regime was the result of a variety
of factors, the most important of which was always the widely divergent political and
security interests of the great powers. The men (for they were almost universally male)
who in Madariaga’s words came to Geneva to discuss ‘this work of disarmament’ were
unable to escape from the powerful contradictory tendencies driving their work. On
the one hand, there was the development of a sense of transnational community
among familiar individuals who mostly worked with genuine sincerity to achieve
a common goal, driven on by the internationalist ideals of the post-war period
which underpinned the existence of the League itself. On the other hand were the
competing national policies they were expected to implement, each intended to
safeguard the security of the individual state, which were themselves manifestations
8 Tyler Wasson, ed., Nobel Prize Winners (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1987), 141–3, 595–7. See also S. S.
Jones, The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations (New York: American Scandinavian Association,
1939).
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of the countervailing nationalist attitudes that were already strong by the start of the
1930s and became ever more powerful as more time passed.
Perhaps more than on any other issue, the politicians, diplomats and soldiers who
dealt with disarmament were caught between these competing pulls. The hopes
that an independent, transnational community might emerge among this group of
experts foundered on the clash of the national perspectives they represented. In
this sense, the disarmament process sponsored by the League remained dominantly
‘inter-national’ rather than ‘trans-national’. Whereas ‘international’ means ‘between
nations’ and so reinforces the idea of dealings between states, ‘transnational’ means
‘extending beyond or across national boundaries’ and so represents a crossing of the
boundaries that separate nations or states. It implies something that goes beyond a
sectarian interest, a critical distinction that has been put in precise fashion by a recent
study of the international women’s movement and its place in the pacifist debates
during and after the First World War. Whereas the term ‘international negotiation’
suggests ‘a balancing of national interests between high-level representatives of both
sides, charged with getting the best possible for their own country at the least cost
in concessions to the other side’, the term ‘transnational’ is more appropriately
used ‘for negotiation based on common interests among people on either side of
the artificial line on the map’.9 The contradiction that emerged in the League-
sponsored disarmament process was between the ‘international’ approach preferred
by the governments of the major powers in particular, who viewed disarmament from
the viewpoint of their own strategic interests, and the ‘transnational’ ambitions of
those League enthusiasts who viewed disarmament as an issue which the world war
had shown intimately to affect all humanity regardless of nationality. As a consequence,
the disarmament talks took on a truly transnational dimension only briefly and within
narrow confines; on the larger scale, they never escaped from the control of the
governments of the major powers. It is not difficult to see why this should be so.
Disarmament was and is tied absolutely to the issue of security, and this was always
likely to be its downfall during this period. Fundamentally, its potential effects on
national security were too great for the individual governments of the major powers
to view it from anything other than a strictly national strategic perspective or to allow
any effective transnational community either to form or to have its way. The problem
in essence was that armaments themselves were inextricably national: that is to say, the
basic unit of any disarmament negotiation was always first and foremost the nation.
There did not exist any non-state community or interest that possessed armaments;
the League possessed no international police force and so had no independent voice
or community of non-national ‘experts’ on armaments from which to draw counsel.
The politicians, diplomats and soldiers who took on the problem of disarmament at
Geneva, nominated by their respective governments, were always going to be national
representatives in the first instance.
9 Jo Vellacott, ‘“Transnationalism” in the Early Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’,
in Harvey L. Dyck, ed., The Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996), 376.
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What, then, was the basis for Madariaga’s optimistic claims to the students in
August 1927 about a transnational attitude at work in Geneva? At the time of
his remarks, in the hopeful interlude of Franco-German reconciliation prompted
by the 1925 treaty of Locarno and the apparently imminent convening of a
general disarmament conference, the vision of international collaboration by national
representatives in the League’s work was still common. This was visibly embodied
in the multinational collection of personnel that made up the League’s Permanent
Secretariat, described by Gilbert Murray (a frequent delegate to the League himself)
in 1929 as ‘a great permanent staff of international officials, whose business is
international co-operation . . . These people know each other; they are familiar with
the question at issue; they see one another’s point of view and national interest.’10
Led by the British diplomat Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretariat was the permanent
administrative organ of the League. Drummond from the start conceived of it as an
international civil service, though contrary to popular belief he always recognised
that it would of necessity play a political role in its own right. While its members –
drawn from over thirty countries and differing in language, religion and degrees of
professional experience – received their appointments from the League directly and
not from their own national governments, the senior posts were deliberately used as
political conduits between Geneva and the key member states.11 Though initially of
precarious existence, the survival of the Secretariat was an enduring accomplishment
of inter-war internationalism. Indeed, the ability of the League and its various organs
to function at all, even on the most basic level of language, is something of an
overlooked triumph: Geneva did not turn into a second Tower of Babel. ‘The
indiscriminate use of English and French for office purposes quickly became an
easy working habit’, recalled Harold Butler, the director of the International Labour
Organisation during the 1930s. ‘In the meetings of the League, too, most of the
delegates knew one or the other well enough for practical purposes.’12
It was members of the Secretariat, working within the many commissions and
special committees created to tackle disarmament, who formed the long-term core
of the League’s transnational approach to the issue. In its original structure, the
Secretariat contained a series of ‘sections’ formed to handle key areas of importance:
Political, Information, Legal, Administrative Commissions and Minorities Questions,
Economic and Financial, Mandates, Transit and Communications, and Social
Questions. The attention that disarmament immediately attracted once the League
began to operate led at the first Assembly in December 1920 to the swift addition of a
‘Disarmament Section’, initially as bureaucratic support specifically for the Temporary
Mixed Commission. This was accomplished despite opposition from the French, who
wished to keep control of the issue strictly in the hands of the major powers via the
military-run Permanent Armaments Commission. They were unable to stem the tide
of opinion in Geneva, however, for the Disarmament Section was in fact expanded
10 Gilbert Murray, The Ordeal of this Generation: The War, the League and the Future (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1929), 77–8.
11 Walters, League of Nations, I, 75–80; James Barros, Office Without Power: Secretary-General Sir Eric
Drummond, 1919–1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 60–71.
12 Harold Butler, The Lost Peace: A Personal Impression (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), 25.
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and made into a distinct independent entity by the 1921 Assembly and was made
permanent by the 1923 Assembly.13 Nevertheless, still included in the membership
of the Disarmament Section were the three secretaries of the PAC’s land, sea and
air sub-commissions, which by informal agreement were permanently assigned to a
French soldier, a British sailor and an Italian airman. These military officers found
it particularly difficult to think in international terms. As Madariaga put it, ‘active
service men lent on short-term contracts to Geneva were expected to remain first
and foremost members of their own fighting services, even though serving in Geneva
as international officials’.14
Always the smallest of the League’s specialised sections, the Disarmament Section
enjoyed a significant continuity in its membership throughout its existence. Its first
director was Professor Bernardo Attolico, who had been chief of the Italian food,
shipping and raw materials organisation in London during the war. His primary role
as under secretary-general for internal administration, and the pressure he came under
from Rome after the Fascist takeover of power in Italy, meant that in practice it was
the ambitious and self-important Madariaga who ran the section from mid-1922 on-
wards, taking formal charge from 1926 until he left Geneva for the chair in Spanish
studies at Oxford at the end of 1927. Eric Colban, a Norwegian who had formerly
headed up the section on minorities, took over until 1930, when Thanassis Aghnides
of Greece, previously a senior member of the Political Section, became director until
the section’s dissolution with the outbreak of war. Only two individuals worked in
the Disarmament Section for its entire existence. Nokhim Sloutski, a Russian émigré
holding a Nansen passport (an internationally recognized identity card first issued by
the League to stateless refugees), edited the League’s Armaments Year-Book and in
1941 published a still useful study on inter-war armaments based on the section’s
massive body of documentation. The long-suffering Mlle Gabrielle Boisseau, from
France, who served as the section’s secretary throughout its life. Among its other
members, Manuel Arocha of Venezuela, M. A. Nolda of Germany and F. T. B.
Friis of Denmark each worked for the commission for at least five years, while from
1931 two Americans, Francis Colt de Wolf and Noel Field, both formerly of the
State Department, served successively in the section.15
The Disarmament Section rapidly became effective at providing bureaucratic
backing for all the League’s disarmament work. Though he faced some initial
13 League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly (2 vols., Geneva: League of Nations, 1920), I, 508;
League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly (3 vols., Geneva: League of Nations, 1921), I, 647–9;
League of Nations, Official Journal (hereafter OJ), special supplement #13 (1923), 154–5. On French
policy see John L. Hogge, ‘Arbitrage, Sécurité, Désarmement: French Security and the League of
Nations, 1920–1925’, Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1994, 33–36, 106–7, 135–6.
14 Salvador de Madariaga, Disarmament (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 82.
15 For the composition of the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat, see samples of the annual staff
list in OJ, III, 9 (1922), 1064; OJ, VIII, 1 (1927), 90; OJ, X, 10 (1930), 1419; OJ, XVI, 10 (1935),
1106; OJ, XX, 11–12 (1939), part I, 466–7. See also Salvador de Madariaga, Morning Without Noon:
Memoirs (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1973), 24–5; Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, The International
Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration (Washington: Carnegie endowment for
International Peace, 1945), 128–30; N. M. Sloutzki, The World Armaments Race, 1919–1939 (Geneva
Research Centre: Geneva Studies, 12, no. 1 ( July 1941)).
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opposition, Madariaga ensured that he was able to attend the meetings of the PAC;
in addition, he (and subsequently his successors) served as secretary to the Third
Committee from 1922 onwards.16 There were other early battles, which helped define
the section’s role. The disarmament clauses in the Covenant had called for the ‘full
and frank’ exchange of information on the scale of national armaments; this became
the basis for efforts by first the PAC and then the Temporary Mixed Commission to
draft and carry out surveys of the extent of armaments around the globe. But when
in February 1922 Attolico circulated a new questionnaire on national armaments
which his section had drafted on its own, he was firmly and fiercely slapped down
by the French representatives. The Disarmament Section’s initiative was exactly the
sort of independent action, outside the control of the main powers, that the French
intended to prevent. Besides their dismay at the general issue of the Secretariat over-
reaching its prerogatives, the questionnaire itself went beyond what the French were
willing to accept by requesting sensitive data on military mobilisation plans. The
hostile attitudes in Paris were caught in a note by a senior French diplomat: ‘It is
dangerous to leave the Secretariat to its own devices’, he wrote,’ ‘[for] disarmament
questions must not be dealt with outside governments’.17 The initial conception
of the exchange of information on armaments as a mandatory submission by each
country of specific data on its military readiness was steadily downgraded to a much
less intrusive process, whereby the League would independently collect data on
each country from official and public sources. In 1923, the Disarmament Section
was directed to compile such a comprehensive report, describing the strength and
equipment of each state’s armed forces, the size of its defence budget and its industrial
production in materials of military use. The result was the appearance in mid-1924
of an Armaments Year-Book, covering thirty-seven countries; it would subsequently
be published annually from 1926 until the outbreak of war and regularly examined
over sixty countries. The section also compiled information on the global arms
trade, which it published annually from 1926 to 1938 as a Statistical Year-Book of the
Trade in Arms and Ammunition; the last edition contained data on sixty countries and
sixty-four colonies, protectorates and mandated territories. These yearbooks came
to be widely regarded as an essential source of information, often the only means
of monitoring changes in national armaments even accounting for the inevitable
distortion of figures, and they formed a significant part of the Disarmament Section’s
legacy.18
Although the section was more than merely secretarial, it did not fulfil the
hopes of some that it might constitute a permanent, non-governmental agency to
monitor continuously the state of world disarmament and supervise dispassionately a
continuing process of international negotiation. The management of the disarmament
16 Madariaga, Morning Without Noon, 26, 79–80.
17 Gout to President Millerand, 10 Feb. 1922, quoted in Hogge, ‘French Security’, 136–7.
18 League of Nations, ‘Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission’ (Geneva, 15 Aug. 1923), League
of Nations Publication (hereafter LNP) A.35.(Part II).1923.IX, 7–9; League of Nations, Armaments
Year-Book: General and Statistical Information, First year (Geneva, 1924), LNP A.37.1924.IX; League of
Nations, Statistical Information on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War (Geneva, January
1926), LNP 1926.IX.2.
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process was instead retained firmly within the hands of commissions of limited
mandate which were filled by national delegates. While a debate over the
establishment of some form of permanent disarmament commission, with supervisory
and possibly even enforcement powers, would echo back and forth within first the
Preparatory Commission and then at the WDC and beyond, the factor defeating
success always remained the refusal of the major powers to accord to an international
body any significant degree of power to act independently in the sphere of national
armaments.
In that regard, the body that probably came the closest to achieving the kind
of transnational co-operation which success in disarmament might have required
was the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments. Pushed through at the
1920 Assembly primarily by the Scandinavian powers, the commission was intended
by its sponsors to supersede the PAC, which had doggedly failed to register any
achievements. In contrast to the all-military composition of the PAC, the new body
was to be composed of private individuals possessing ‘the requisite competence in
matters of a political, social and economic nature’. With their range of experience and
personal independence, the TMC’s members were expected to approach the problem
of disarmament in broader terms and without having their hands tied by their various
governments. Six members (expanded by 1923 to fourteen) with ‘political’ expertise
were to be appointed by the Council, four would be appointed by the League’s
Economic and Financial Committee, and six would be drawn from the employers’
and workers’ groups of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The original
conception that this would be an entirely civilian body was overturned, however, as
the French and the British ensured that the new commission would also include six
military representatives, drawn from the PAC, to provide a check on the potentially
dangerous idealism of the civilian members. In addition, the new commission was
given only a ‘temporary’ character, with its mandate to be reviewed annually; the
repeated French attempts to block the renewal of the commission’s mandate all
failed.19 It was the lack of national accountability that was so objectionable to both
Paris and London. Marshal Emile Fayolle, a French member of both the PAC and
TMC, complained that ‘the creation of this temporary commission . . . is useless
and untimely’, while the head of the British Foreign Office, Sir Eyre Crowe, would
similarly lambaste the TMC’s membership as ‘absolutely irresponsible amateurs’.20 Yet
this independence was of course exactly what appealed to others: as one commentator
approvingly pointed out, ‘the aim was clearly to obtain a committee more or less
denationalised in its collective nature’ with a membership that was ‘neither entirely
19 Records of the First Assembly, I, 503–9; OJ, II, 2 (1921), 146–7; Wheeler-Bennett, Reduction of Armaments,
34; Walters, League of Nations, I, 219–21; Marie-Renée Mouton, La Société des Nations et les intérêts de
la France, 1920–1924 (Bern: Lang, 1995), 268–78.
20 Report by Fayolle, 4 Oct. 1921, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (herafter MAE), série Société
des Nations (hereafter SDN), 706, fos. 224–7; minute by Crowe, 1 March 1924, quoted in G. A.
Silverlock, ‘Issues of Disarmament in British Defence and Foreign Policy, 1918–1925’, Ph.D. thesis,
King’s College, London, 2000, 52.
The League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920–1938 503
militarists, nor officials, nor technicians, nor the satellites of statesmen’.21 Indeed,
its entire rationale was that, unlike other League committees dealing with the issue,
its members were not representing their governments and so were free to advance
whatever ideas seemed most likely to produce real progress. This was brought out
most starkly in February 1922, when one of the ‘political’ delegates, Lord Esher, a
Liberal peer who as the eminence grise of British defence planning before the war had
been a long-serving member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, submitted on
his own personal initiative a radical scheme to limit land armaments. Not only did
the French find his idea unacceptable, evaluating it as ‘a simplistic plan that might
have been applicable for the 18th century’, so did Esher’s own government, for he
had advanced it without backing from London.22
The Temporary Mixed Commission was an active body, meeting ten times
between July 1921 and July 1924 and creating numerous sub-committees to study
specific issues.23 It began its work rather narrowly, however, with its initial focus
on a limited conception of disarmament intended to establish tentative regimes of
control over armaments rather than on ambitious schemes for sweeping reductions
of armaments. The French had ensured that the commission had one of their own
as its president, René Viviani, the prime minister at the outbreak of war in 1914,
and both he and the other French delegates, such as Colonel Réquin, very much
took their lead from Paris. Viviani delayed convening its first meeting for as long as
possible and thereafter as much as possible steered its work into less contentious areas.
Three of the TMC’s first four meetings were held in Paris, reflecting the French
desire to dominate its agenda. As the French hold over the commission slipped, its
meetings similarly shifted to Geneva. This is not to say that it did not do useful work.
It co-ordinated the efforts to implement the exchange of information on national
armaments, it pressed ahead with attempts to study and publicise the horrors of
21 H. R. G. Greaves, The League Committees and World Order: A Study of the Permanent Expert Committees
of the League of Nations as an Instrument of International Government (London: Oxford University Press,
1931), 209.
22 Memo by Réquin, 25 Feb. 1922, MAE, SDN, 707, fos. 68–72. See also memos by Réquin, 24 Feb.
and 5 April 1922, ibid., fos. 52 and 131; Philip Towle, ‘British Security and Disarmament Policy
in Europe in the 1920s’, in R. Ahmann, A. M. Birke and M. Howard, eds., The Quest for Stability:
Problems of West European Security, 1918–1957 (London: German Historical Institute, 1993), 131–5.
23 For the composition of the TMC, see sample membership lists in Monthly Summary of the League of
Nations (hereafter MSLN): MSLN, II, 10 (Oct. 1922), 268–9, and MSLN, IV, 1 (1924), 18–19. Its main
‘political’ members were René Viviani and Albert Lebrun (France), Lord Robert Cecil, H. A. L.
Fisher and Lord Reginald Esher (Britain), Carlo Schanzer (Italy), Karl Branting (Sweden), Colonel
Emil Lohner (Switzerland), Enrique Villegas (Chile), Eduardo Cobian (Spain), Francisco Urrutia
(Colombia) and Eino Holsti (Finland). Key military representatives from the PAC included Marshal
Emile Fayolle and Colonel Edouard Réquin (France), Rear-Admiral Aubrey Smith and Rear-Admiral
John Segrave (Britain), General Giovanni Marietti and General Alberto de Marinis (Italy), General S.
Inagaki ( Japan), Rear-Admiral Antonio Marques de Magaz (Spain), and Rear-Admiral José Penido
and Rear-Admiral L. M. de Souza (Brazil). The greatest continuity was among the members from
the economic world, with the largest roles played by Albert Janssen (Belgium), from the League’s
Financial Committee, Colonel David Carnegie (Canada), an employers’ representative from the ILO,
and Léon Jouhaux (France), secretary-general of the Confédération Générale du Travail, a workers’
representative from the ILO.
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chemical warfare, and it oversaw the drafting of a new treaty on the global arms
traffic and the attempts to draft a similar treaty regulating the private manufacture
of arms.24 It also pursued a scheme, arising from an initial proposal by Admiral
Segrave, one of the delegates drafted in from the PAC, to extend to lesser maritime
states the principles of ratios of naval strength agreed between the chief naval powers
at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22. This resulted in an unsuccessful
naval conference held in Rome in February 1924, which failed due to the stubborn
resistance of the smaller states to accept the limits that the main maritime states sought
to impose on them.25 The real progress made on the arms trade treaty was led by
the concerted efforts of the Temporary Mixed Commission – the limiting factor for
many years was in fact the non-participation of the United States – and it led to the
treaty being approved at a conference in Geneva in May–June 1925. The conference
was attended by forty-four nations, represented by a selection of individuals already
or soon-to-be well-experienced in the disarmament question. Even this success was
more apparent than real, however, for the proceedings of the conference revealed
a deep split between the larger and smaller powers over issues of state sovereignty,
and the treaty itself never actually came into force.26 The private manufacture of
armaments, for its part, would preoccupy both the Temporary Mixed Commission
and a series of successor special committees throughout the 1920s, drawing in many
veterans of the disarmament talks. The years of fruitless meetings, however, ultimately
resulted only in a still-disputed plan that was never put up for ratification.27 Still other
special sub-committees of the TMC, which dealt for instance with chemical warfare,
always managed, though small, to include a core membership of Réquin from France,
de Marinis from Italy and Cecil from Britain.28
In the midst of all this more limited work, the expansion of the number of the
Temporary Mixed Commission’s ‘political’ members in early 1922 was the spark for
24 League of Nations, ‘Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission’ (Geneva, 15 Sept. 1921), LNP
A.81.1921.IX; League of Nations, ‘Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission’ (Geneva, 30 July
1924), LNP A.16.1924.IX.
25 League of Nations, Naval Sub-commission of PAC, ‘Extension to Non-Signatory States of the
Principles of the Treaty of Washington for the Limitation of Naval Armaments’, 25 Feb. 1924, LNP
C.76.1924.IX.
26 League of Nations, Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms
and Ammunition and in Implements of War, Geneva, 4 May to 17 June 1925 (Geneva, September 1925),
LNP A.13.1925.IX. Familiar delegates at the conference included Gustavo Guerrero (Salvador, vice-
president of the conference), Joseph Paul-Boncour (France), General Alberto de Marinis (Italy),
Christian Lange (Norway), Eduardo Cobian (Spain), Francisco Urrutia (Colombia), Enrique Buero
(Uruguay), Admiral L. M. de Souza (Brazil), along with Swedish under-secretary of commerce Einar
Hennings, the permanent Czechoslovakian delegate to the League, Ferdinand Veverka, and the US
minister to Switzerland, Hugh Gibson.
27 MSLN, IV, 2 (1924), 32–3; MSLN, VII, 3 (1927), 58–9; MSLN, IX, 8 (1929), 256–7. Key delegates
dealing with the private manufacture of armaments included Colonel Edouard Réquin, Léon Jouhaux
and Joseph Paul-Boncour (France), General Alberto de Marinis (Italy), Lord Robert Cecil (Britain),
Count Johann von Bernstorff (Germany), Eduardo Cobian (Spain), François Sokal (Poland), Louis de
Brouckère (Belgium), Ferdinand Veverka (Czechoslovakia), Francisco Urrutia (Colombia), Alberto
Guani (Uruguay), Gustavo Guerrero (Salvador), Naotake Sato ( Japan) and Hugh Gibson (United
States).
28 MSLN, III, 3 (1923), 51.
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a momentous shift in the commission’s approach to disarmament. Not originally a
member of the commission, Cecil managed to force his way onto the TMC despite
French resistance, abetted by the even greater opposition in Paris to the candidacy
of Lange with ‘his dangerous pacifist inclinations’.29 Cecil at once set about taking
control of the commission’s agenda in order to realise his own vision of achieving
general disarmament through the provision of new systems for international security.
In a political climate where states felt secure, he argued, they would be willing to
reduce their armed forces.30 Cecil was one of the most remarkable men whom the
League of Nations attracted during the course of its existence. He was a tireless
champion of the League and with his ‘tall black-coated figure, rounded shoulders
and outthrust head’ was one of the most familiar sights in its halls. ‘He looked like
a benevolent vulture’, recalled the American diplomat Hugh Wilson.31 What made
Cecil unique was his willingness to free himself from the restrictions of pursuing
disarmament solely along the lines of British strategic self-interest. At the first three
sessions of the Assembly, he had in fact represented South Africa and so could and
did take a sweeping, independent stance in Geneva. He tried to maintain such a line
whenever possible once he became an official British delegate in 1923. The foreign
secretary, Austen Chamberlain, indeed complained about him in 1925 that ‘both in
Paris and Rome I got hints, quite polite but quite unmistakeable, that in recent years
we seemed to have spoken with two voices – one at Geneva, another in the Foreign
Office – and our reputation for good faith has suffered in consequence’.32 Even in
January 1930, as the British government representative at the meeting of yet another
League committee on new security measures, he would still take an individual stand
contrary to that advised by the Foreign Office. ‘Had you desired merely a gramophone
mouthpiece, you ought to have sent somebody else’, he replied to complaints from
London.33 And yet even Cecil could not stray too far from his government’s official
line, lest his actions be subsequently repudiated by London (as they were in 1930).
This made the Temporary Mixed Commission the ideal platform for him, for despite
the French conception of its members functioning as national representatives, in
formal terms they represented no one but themselves.
Cecil put forward to the commission a series of proposals that attempted to link
disarmament with security, eventually submitting an actual draft treaty during 1923.
His active French counterpart, Colonel Réquin, was aware that here again there was
no actual backing in London for such personal efforts – indeed, Réquin learned
that Admiral Segrave had official instructions to vote against Cecil’s scheme – and so
submitted a competing draft treaty of his own.34 What made matters difficult for the
29 Report by Service Française de la Société des Nations, 18 Feb. 1922, MAE, SDN, 707, fo. 21.
30 Viscount Cecil, A Great Experiment (London: J. Cape, 1941), 124–5, 138–41.
31 Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars, 218–19. On Cecil see also Lord Robert Cecil, All the Way (London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1949); Major-General A. C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe rev.
edn (London: Collins, 1939), 66–9.
32 Chamberlain to Salisbury, 2 Jan. 1925, National Archives (hereafter TNA), FO 800/257, fos. 13–14.
33 Cecil (Geneva) to Noel-Baker, 4 March 1930, British Library (hereafter BL), Cecil papers, Add. Mss.
51107.
34 Memo by Réquin, 12 June 1932, MAE, SDN, 828, fos. 208–14. See also minutes of Committee of
Imperial Defence, 11 April 1932, TNA, CAB 2/3.
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French was that Cecil chaired the series of TMC sub-committees created to study the
linking of disarmament to new security measures.35 The two drafts were eventually
amalgamated to produce a ‘Treaty of Mutual Assistance’, presented to and endorsed
by the Assembly in September 1923, when Cecil was for the first time a formal British
delegate.36 It was a particularly awkward moment for the British government, as (in
the words of a Foreign Office official) ‘the scheme originally proposed by [Cecil]
when in the position of an irresponsible member of a committee, not representing
his government, has now assumed final form at a moment when he has become
the official representative of His Majesty’s Government’.37 Only an election and a
change of government in London from Conservative to Labour resolved the situation
without difficult or embarrassing choices having to be made.
With the subsequent rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in July 1924 by
the new Labour government, work on its sequel moved outside the TMC. External
imperatives such as the pressure of domestic public opinion and the need for improved
Anglo-French relations drove officials in London to join with those in Paris to seek
a replacement at the 1924 Assembly. This was found in the ‘Protocol for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes’, known as the Geneva Protocol, negotiated
mainly between the British and French during a few feverish weeks in Geneva.
The Protocol rested on the triple formula of ‘security, arbitration, disarmament’,
the key point being its emphasis on the prevention of conflicts through machinery
for the compulsory settlement of international disputes. Disarmament was not faced
head-on; rather, the implementation of the Protocol’s security provisions were made
dependent on the successful conclusion of a general disarmament conference which
was to meet during mid-1925. The drafting process for the Protocol was initiated by a
joint Anglo-French resolution, drawn up with the mediating help of Edouard Beneš,
the Czech foreign minister: the Third Committee (chaired by Beneš) was charged
with drafting the security and disarmament provisions of the new agreement; the First
Committee (which dealt with legal and constitutional questions and was chaired by
Politis of Greece), was to draft provisions for compulsory arbitration and conflict
resolution. It was the French and British delegates who stood at the heart of the
negotiations, including Joseph Paul-Boncour, Henry de Jouvenel and Léon Jouhaux
from the former and Labour ministers Lord Parmoor and Arthur Henderson from
the latter – Cecil himself, critically, was not invited to Geneva by the Labour
government – but it was Beneš who charted the way between them, with numerous
successive drafts.38 The Protocol’s formula for defining the aggressor in any future
35 MSLN, II, 7 (1922), 143–4; MSLN, III, 2 (1923), 5–6; MSLN, III, 5 (1923), 101; MSLN, III, 7
(1923), 143. The core members of these sub-committees were Lord Robert Cecil (Britain), Colonel
Edouard Réquin and Léon Jouhaux (France), General Giovanni Marietti and General Alberto de
Marinis (Italy), Albert Janssen (Belgium) and Colonel Emil Lohner (Switzerland).
36 MSLN, III, 9 (1923), 236–9; Wheeler-Bennett, Reduction of Armaments, 61–81.
37 Foreign Office memo by Campbell, 25 Jan. 1924, TNA, FO 371/10568, W637/1334/98.
38 Reports of the First and Third Committees, MSLN, IV, supplement (1924), 6–33; MacDonald diary,
21 Sept. 1924, TNA, PRO 30/69/1753; Parmoor to Foreign Office, 18 Sept. 1924, TNA, FO
371/10570, W8063/134/98. See also P. J. Noel Baker, The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes (London: P. S. King, 1925).
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conflict was notably influenced by the appearance of the so-called ‘American plan’
(also known as the ‘Shotwell plan’), a draft treaty submitted to the League during 1924
by a group of American academics, former diplomats and soldiers headed by Professor
James Shotwell, many of whom were connected with the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Its particular interest was as an almost unique input into the
League’s disarmament process from completely outside the League itself: ‘We have
no official connections whatever and can speak only for ourselves’, assured Shotwell
in his covering letter to Secretary-General Drummond.39 As for the Geneva Protocol,
the final result of such intensive negotiations at the 1924 Assembly, it was not truly
satisfactory to either Britain or France, and in fact the new British Conservative
government rejected it early in 1925. Attention that year instead focused on the
private negotiations between Britain, France and Germany for a Western security
pact, which ultimately resulted in the signing in December of the treaty of Locarno.
The Temporary Mixed Commission showed both the possibilities and limits of
the dream for a transnational approach to disarmament. Cecil’s initiatives, undertaken
independently of his government and without their support, roused real enthusiasm
among the other members of the commission and forced the French delegates to
respond. The result was a draft treaty that came close to gaining acceptance from the
League’s member states. Esher, on the other hand, while also acting independently in
submitting a draft disarmament scheme, was by contrast quick to let his scheme lapse
when it was faced with the stern disapproval of London and Paris.40 The TMC’s
unofficial, independent representatives were in fact at best semi-state actors trying to
serve two masters, both the League disarmament vision and their own governments.
Many of its members, and not only those from France, never acted as anything
other than de facto national delegates. The independence of spirit shown by the
commission always remained objectionable to the major powers. It did not represent
their official armaments policies and so, ‘like the dormouse when it became too
rowdy’, it was shoved abruptly into the teapot when the chance came in 1925 to
replace it with a more amenable disarmament body in the form of the Preparatory
Commission for the Disarmament Conference.41
Though central to the League’s work on disarmament, its Secretariat and special
commissions possessed a relatively low profile. The individuals who were dominant
in the public eye were in fact the politicians and diplomats who appeared at the
annual meetings of the League Assembly and participated in the debates of its ‘Third
Committee’ on disarmament.42 Many of them were of course the same veterans of
the Geneva scene who sat on those less conspicuous commissions. Such an overlap
39 League of Nations, ‘Draft Treaty on Disarmament and Security, Prepared, with a Commentary, by
an American Group’, 7 July 1924, LNP C.339.1924.IX. See also James T. Shotwell, On the Rim of the
Abyss (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 14–21, 378–85; Walters, League of Nations, I, 269–70.
40 Esher to Poincaré, 15 June 1922, MAE, SDN, 707, fos. 259–60; Towle, ‘British security and
disarmament policy’, 134.
41 Greaves, The League Committees and World Order, 215.
42 For the composition of the Third Committee at the Assembly, see sample membership lists in OJ,
special supplement #16 (Geneva, 1923), 5–6; OJ, special supplement #47 (Geneva, 1926), 5–6; OJ,
special supplement #78 (Geneva, 1929), 6–7; OJ, special supplement #172 (Geneva, 1937), 5–6.
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of personnel was indicative of the close rein under which most were kept by their
respective governments. The delegates from the major powers, such as Lord Robert
Cecil for Britain, Joseph Paul-Boncour for France and Count Johann von Bernstorff
for Germany, unsurprisingly exercised the most influence. Nevertheless, it was one
of the abiding characteristics of the League system that, even on questions as vital as
disarmament, it also gave a voice and a powerful public platform to the lesser powers.
This was in evidence at the very first Assembly, when the Scandinavian states insisted
that the question of general disarmament be put onto the agenda. Karl Branting of
Sweden and Christian Lange of Norway were particularly active in pressing for greater
progress towards actual disarmament. While Branting presided over the disarmament
committee at the 1920 Assembly (and would do so again the following year), Lange
forcefully backed an attempt to establish some form of limit on national military
budgets, vowing that ‘the peoples will be sadly disillusioned if we leave this hall
having given them only a promise – and that a vague one – of studying the question
of armaments a long time hence . . . we must do something tangible today’.43 A
proposal for a two-year freeze on national armaments expenditure was indeed adopted
and circulated to the member states for approval; unfortunately but unsurprisingly
it came to nothing, despite repeated attempts over the next four years to garner
international support. Lange’s words were consistent with the character of most of
the speeches on disarmament from the smaller powers at these early Assemblies:
disarmament had to come soon, it was insisted, for world public opinion demanded
it and stable peace could not be secured without it. In their advocacy of such
initiatives, the representatives of the smaller powers became in effect governmental
voices putting the case for a transnational approach. Yet this forum too proved
ultimately unproductive. Despite the prestigious status of the annual gatherings of
the Assembly and the global attention they garnered, they themselves generated few
of the League’s disarmament initiatives. The Third Committee’s early resolutions
instead tended to stick to the confirmation or modification of the work of the PAC
and TMC. After the creation of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament
Conference, its active role diminished even further as it was reduced to standing on
Key delegates included: H.A.L. Fisher (Britain, 1920–22), Lord Robert Cecil (South Africa, 1920–
22, and Britain, 1923, 1926, 1929–31), Joseph Paul-Boncour (France, 1924–28, 1936–38), Henry
de Jouvenel (France, 1922, 1924–26), Léon Jouhaux (France, 1924–28, 1930–31, 1936–37) René
Massigli (France, 1929–31), Carlo Schanzer (Italy, 1920–21, 1924) General Alberto de Marinis (Italy,
1924–31), Count Johann von Bernstorff (Germany, 1926–31), Karl Branting (Sweden, 1920–24),
Rickard Sandler (Sweden, 1927, 1929–31, 1936–38), Christian Lange (Norway, 1920–26, 1928–
31, 1936–38), Eino Rudolf Holsti (Finland, 1922–31, 1936–38), Peter Munch (Denmark, 1924–26,
1929–31, 1936–38), Paul Hymans (Belgium, 1920, 1922, 1924), Louis de Brouckère (Belgium, 1925–
27), Jan Loudon (Netherlands, 1922–29), Giuseppe Motta (Switzerland, 1920, 1922, 1925–28, 1936–
37), Edouard Beneš (Czechoslovakia, 1920, 1922–31), Nicolas Politis (Greece, 1924, 1927–31, 1936–
38), Eméric Pflügl (Austria, 1921–31, 1936–37), François Sokal (Poland, 1927–31), Eduardo Cobian
(Spain, 1924–25, 1928–30), Augusto de Vasconcellos (Portugal, 1923–25, 1927, 1936), Enrique Villegas
(Chile, 1924–26, 1928–31), Francisco José Urrutia (Colombia, 1920–27, 1930), J. Gustavo Guerrero
(Salvador, 1920, 1923–28, 1930), Enrique Buero (Uruguay, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1931), and Naotake
Sato ( Japan, 1926, 1928–30).
43 Speech by Lange, 14 Dec. 1920, Records of the First Assembly, I, 524–6.
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the sidelines and exhorting the PCDC about ‘the necessity of accomplishing the
first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments with as little delay as
possible’.44 By the end of the decade, the subject had been practically talked out.
In his address to the 1929 Assembly, Beneš, the Czech foreign minister, commented
wryly that the preparatory work for a disarmament conference certainly now had
to be on the verge of completion, for ‘we have hardly anything left to say to one
another. Each of us knows the others’ views by heart – so much so that we could
change places with the greatest ease.’45 When the World Disarmament Conference
finally opened in February 1932, it was decided to suspend further meetings of the
Third Committee while the conference was in session; it would not reconvene until
1936.
It was the element of national interest that would invariably trump the transnational
vision in the League-sponsored disarmament process, asserting itself particularly
strongly during the 1920s on more tightly controlled commissions such as the PAC
and PCDC. These forums only demonstrated how worryingly indefinite was the
idea of a ‘League spirit’. It seemingly had little to do with the host city itself, for
most delegates could not bear Geneva’s stuffy hotels, bad food and cold winters.
Sir John Simon, a frequent visitor as British foreign secretary in the early 1930s,
considered it ‘a dreadful place, well worthy of Calvin’.46 The countryside around the
city provided some diversion (whether for vigorous walks or good meals in rural inns)
from the negative aspects of so much international mingling, namely ‘the gossip of the
cosmopolitan politicians, the huge dreary dinner-parties given by different nations
in turn, the depressing cocktail parties and receptions’.47 Gaps in understanding and
acceptance between the different linguistic, ethnic and racial groups present at League
meetings similarly challenged the blithe assertions of its multinational amity. There is,
unfortunately, no shortage of disparaging comments even from the most progressive
pro-League European commentators about the shortcomings of the non-European
nations. In one of the milder examples of the sort, Gilbert Murray, then representing
South Africa, wrote from Geneva about the 1921 Assembly that ‘one was conscious
of many weaknesses in the Assembly: some intrigue, some loquacity, a rather large
proportion of small dark Latin nations and so on’.48
44 Resolution of the Third Committee, 25 Sept. 1928, OJ, special supplement #63 (Geneva, 1928), 57.
45 Speech by Benes, 9 Sept. 1929, OJ, special supplement #75 (Geneva, 1929), 73–6. For other examples
see speech by Cecil, 1 Oct. 1921, Records of the Second Assembly, I, 627–31; speech by Hymans, 26 Sept.
1922, Records of the Third Assembly, I, 261–4; speech by Urrutia, 29 Sept. 1923, OJ, special supplement
#13 (Geneva, 1923), 151–2; speech by Villegas, 23 Sept. 1926, OJ, special supplement #44 (Geneva,
1926), 102–3; speech by Paul-Boncour, 18 Sept. 1928, OJ, special supplement #67 (Geneva, 1928),
58–62.
46 Simon to Baldwin, 11 Oct. 1933, Cambridge University Library (hereafter CUL), Baldwin papers,
121, fo. 83.
47 Viscount Norwich (Alfred Duff Cooper), Old Men Forget (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1954), 163.
See also Mary Agnes Hamilton, Remembering My Good Friends (London: Cape, 1944), 186–9.
48 Murray to Smuts, 8 Oct. 1921, quoted in Salvador de Madariaga, ‘Gilbert Murray and the League’,
in Gilbert Murray, An Unfinished Autobiography (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), 185.
510 Contemporary European History
It was the soldiers, sailors and airmen who quickly acquired the worst reputation
as obstacles to a transnational approach to disarmament. The first substantive step of
the League’s disarmament work was the creation by the Council in May 1920 of a
Permanent Armaments Commission, as specified by Article 9 of the Covenant. Each
Council member had three representatives on the commission – military officers
expert in land, naval and air questions respectively – who were responsible to their
various governments and general staffs. The most active and important members
on the commission were those from the major European powers, but many also
played other roles, including serving on the Temporary Mixed Commission and
appearing as national representatives on the Assembly’s Third Committee.49 The most
dynamic figure was unquestionably Colonel Edouard Réquin of France. Madariaga,
for one, remembered him as ‘the most intelligent and forcible [sic] member of the
Commission’.50 Despite his formal status usually being that of a substitute delegate,
it was Réquin who co-ordinated French policy planning for PAC meetings and
who did the legwork in Geneva itself. Returning to Paris after yet another round of
private discussions, this time lobbying French allies in preparation for a meeting of
the Temporary Mixed Commission (on which he also sat), he commented, ‘I have
no hesitation in confirming that these frequent personal liaisons in Geneva, outside
the sessions of our commissions, afford us a real influence and serious advantages.’51
Dominated by the representatives of the major powers, the PAC’s agenda and
proceedings over the years when it engaged in substantive work (1920–6) would
focus on national security interests rather than on co-operation along international
lines. It made no significant efforts to draft a meaningful scheme of armaments
reduction; indeed, in December 1920 it formally advised that such an attempt was
both premature and potentially dangerous.52 The commission’s focus was instead
almost entirely on a set of limited and highly technical tasks. These included laying
down regulations for the military forces of states which applied for admission to
the League (such as Estonia and Finland), compiling statistical surveys of national
arms programmes and, most broadly, offering technical assessments of the other
League disarmament initiatives. In particular, the French representatives ensured
that the commission gave its primary attention to the preparation of a scheme for
implementing the Council’s right of inspection in the former enemy states, as specified
49 For the composition of the PAC, see sample membership lists, MSLN, II, 10 (1922), 271, and MSLN,
IV, 1 (1924), 16–18. The most important members were Rear-Admiral John Segrave, Rear-Admiral
Aubrey Smith and Colonel J. S. Lowe (Britain); Marshal Emile Fayolle, Vice-Admiral V. Jehenne,
Captain J. Deleuze, General Jacques Dumesnil and Colonel Edouard Réquin (France); General
Giovanni Marietti and General Alberto de Marinis (Italy); General S. Inagaki and Rear-Admiral J.
Kiyokawa ( Japan); Rear-Admiral Antonio Marques de Magaz (Spain); and Rear-Admiral José Penido
and Rear-Admiral L. M. de Souza (Brazil).
50 Madariaga, Morning Without Noon, 61.
51 Memo by Réquin, 28 June 1922, MAE, SDN, 708, fos. 75–6.
52 Edouard Réquin, D’une guerre à l’autre, 1919–1939 (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1949), 13–14, 23–27;
Walters, League of Nations, I, 120–1, 171, 219; League of Nations, Procès-Verbal of Meetings of the Council,
1920, ‘General Report of the Permanent Advisory Commission’, LNP 20/29/17, 30.
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in Article 213 of the Versailles treaty.53 Given the strictly military composition of
the PAC, such an unproductive outcome should perhaps not have been altogether
surprising and there was no shortage of commentators willing to offer cynical
explanations of why this might be so. ‘It was as foolish to expect a disarmament
convention from such a commission as a declaration of atheism from a commission
of clergymen’, Madariaga would reflect in 1929.54 Another study mocked derisively
that, ‘while the health official as such has no vested interest in the maintenance of
ill-health, the same can hardly be said to apply to the military technician in relation to
an army and a navy’.55 Certainly, there seemed to be no very active progress made by
this group: some of its meetings were entirely futile, for example its seventh session in
May 1922, when the commission after five days of discussions declared itself unable
to give a precise definition of the term ‘war material’.56
For their part, however, the military men clung resolutely to arguments of simple
pragmatism and the minimum requirements of national security in a world where war
was an inevitable part of human society. As one of the foremost military thinkers of the
interwar period, J. F. C. Fuller, asserted unequivocally, ‘Until humanity has evolved to
a more perfect state of peacefulness, wars are likely to be necessary as moral purges.’57
None of the armed service chiefs, particularly those of the two states – Britain and
France – that formed the key to any progress in League-sponsored disarmament,
believed that greater security could be obtained through arms reductions. Rather,
they shared the assumption that sufficient military power was in fact essential to
guarantee the safety of the state. This led to equally cynical dismissive evaluations of
the pro-disarmament lobby: ‘The argument that war can never be abolished, since
it is merely the outcome of the inexorable laws of evolution, is responsible for the
opinion, particularly widespread in Service circles, that all supporters of the League
of Nations are academic idealists or, in other words, cranks.’58 The results of this
tendency for each nation’s military delegates to defend their own country’s specific
need for armaments was seen most clearly in the work of the PAC during 1926, in
its slightly expanded form as Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission
for the Disarmament Conference. After seven months of intense labour, it produced
a report so crowded with reservations, minority opinions and declarations that it
constituted no agreement at all but rather formed a mere compendium of individual
national positions. On each issue of debate, the battle was fought on strictly national
grounds. Even on the most basic question put to the sub-commission – ‘What is to
be understood by the expression ‘armaments’?’ – it returned three competing replies:
the first from Britain, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
and the United States; the second from Argentina, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France,
53 League of Nations, ‘Rules adopted by the Council for the Exercise of the Right of Investigation’
(Geneva, 15 Dec. 1926), LNP 1926.IX.17.
54 Madariaga, Disarmament, 78–9.
55 Greaves, The League Committees and World Order, 206.
56 MSLN, II, 5 (1922), 95.
57 Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, The Dragon’s Teeth (London: Constable, 1932), 123–4.
58 Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen (London: Faber, 1934), 33.
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Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia; and the third from Chile on its own.59
The British military delegate on the sub-commission, Colonel (later Major-General)
A. C. Temperley, recalled the ridicule heaped on them at the time and offered up
the simple explanation for the difficulties. ‘Soldiers, sailors and airmen, like other
experts, are not ideally fitted for Commissions, as they are not trained as debaters
and, being wed to discipline, are apt to adhere more rigidly to instructions than
politicians are accustomed to do. Deadlocks are more frequent and compromises
more rare.’ Yet, he went on, the relations between the delegates on the commission
during that hot and tedious summer in Geneva were generally very pleasant. ‘There
was a genuine camaraderie between the various members which I have never seen
in political commissions, due to our common service in the profession of arms.’60
In December 1925, buoyed by the successful conclusion of the Locarno treaty, the
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference was created to prepare the
way for the convening of a conference to implement general disarmament on a global
scale. Initial expectations were that the so-called World Disarmament Conference
would meet early in 1927 at the latest; in practice, the Preparatory Commission only
finally succeeded in drawing up a draft disarmament convention in December 1930.
Much of this was the result of the change in the character of the disarmament process
which followed the dissolution of the Temporary Mixed Commission. ‘Disarmament
had now entered into a more official phase’, Madariaga reflected, ‘and what was
wanted was a committee composed of accredited government representatives with
powers to negotiate.’61 Many of these delegates were again the same figures who
had already sat ‘independently’ on the Temporary Mixed Commission or officially
represented their country on the Third Committee, such as Cecil, Paul-Boncour,
de Marinis and Lange. The Preparatory Commission’s membership also included
delegates from the three critical non-League members: Count Johann von Bernstorff
from Germany (which joined the League in 1926), Maxim Litvinoff from the
USSR (who only began to attend in 1927) and the two ‘Hughs’, Gibson and
Wilson, successive US ministers to Berne.62 From this point on, the international
community of disarmament negotiators now routinely included German, Soviet
and US representatives. In addition, running alongside the Preparatory Commission
59 League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, ‘Report of Sub-
Commission A (Military, Naval and Air)’ (Geneva, Dec. 1926), LNP 1926.IX.16.
60 Temperley, Whispering Gallery, 53.
61 Madariaga, Disarmament, 129–30.
62 For the composition of the PCDC, see sample membership lists in League of Nations, Documents of the
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (hereafter DPCDC), Series IV (Geneva, 15 June
1927), LNP 1927.IX.5, 6; DPCDC, Series VIII (Geneva, 25 May 1929), LNP 1929.IX.3, 6; DPCDC,
Series X (Geneva, 15 Jan. 1931), LNP 1931.IX.1, 13. Its key members were Jan Loudon (Netherlands,
president of the commission), Lord Robert Cecil (Britain, until his resignation from the Cabinet in the
wake of the failed 1927 Geneva Naval Conference), Lord Cushendun (Britain), Joseph Paul-Boncour
(France), René Massigli (France), General Alberto de Marinis (Italy), Naotake Sato ( Japan), Louis
de Brouckère (Belgium), Einar Hennings (Sweden), Eino Holsti (Finland), Nicolas Politis (Greece),
Eduardo Cobian (Spain), Ferdinand Veverka (Czechoslovakia), François Sokal (Poland), Francisco
Urrutia (Colombia), and Gustavo Guerrero (Salvador), along with Count Johann von Bernstorff
(Germany), Maxim Litvinoff (USSR), Hugh Gibson (United States) and Hugh Wilson (United
States).
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between 1927 and 1930 was its offshoot, the Committee on Arbitration and Security,
which included many of the same figures, although its work steadily diverged from the
PCDC and proceeded chiefly towards the elaboration of new forms of international
arbitration.63
The nature of the change that had taken place with the creation of the PCDC was
quickly evident. General de Marinis, the ubiquitous Italian delegate, was expressing
a common view when he insisted on the first day of its first session on the
clarification of the status of the commission and its sub-commissions. ‘It must
be clearly understood that . . . members will represent their governments and will
not speak in a personal capacity’, he pointed out. The French delegate, Joseph
Paul-Boncour, unsurprisingly concurred: ‘The final decision rests with us alone,
as representatives of our governments.’64 The consequence was that the members
of the PCDC had very little room to depart from their formal instructions, with
their primary identities as national delegates overpowering the alternative role of
transnational disarmament experts. It was significant that matters were decided by
vote on the PCDC, not settled by consensus. The early sessions were nevertheless
able to skate over fundamental disagreements (such as how to limit each state’s
numbers of trained military reservists) by continually postponing confrontations over
contentious issues, causing the commission’s work to drag out in stalemate. The
results raised mixed reactions in the various national capitals: the massive report of
one sub-commission was rather airily dismissed by a Foreign Office official in London
as ‘a marvellous piece of work when one considers the polyglot composition of the
committee. But what waste of time and money’.65 Elements of agreement did not
spring from fruitful searches for common ground among the delegates, but rather
came as concessions driven primarily by national pressures from home, made in order
not to garner the blame for failure. When a ‘second reading’ draft treaty emerged
from the commission in May 1929, it was because the setbacks of the previous years
had left the major powers in a chastened mood and willing merely to abandon their
most contested proposals.66
Further delay was no longer an option when the commission met for what
would be its final session in November–December 1930. Though it did manage at
last to conclude a draft disarmament treaty, it still proved impossible to find a way
to harmonise the fundamental political conflicts dividing the major powers. While
many of the usual faces were there, the key players would be the delegates of the
major European powers – Cecil for Britain, Massigli for France and Bernstorff for
63 For the composition of the CAS, see sample membership lists in DPCDC, Series V (Geneva,
16 Jan. 1928), LNP 1928.IX.2, 35; DPCDC, Series IX (Geneva, 16 June 1930), LNP 1930.IX.3, 7.
Its key members included Edouard Beneš (Czechoslovakia, president of the committee), Joseph Paul-
Boncour (France), René Massigli (France), Lord Robert Cecil (Britain), Lord Cushendun (Britain),
General Alberto de Marinis (Italy), Eino Holsti (Finland), Nicolas Politis (Greece), François Sokal
(Poland) and Naotake Sato ( Japan).
64 Speeches by de Marinis and Paul-Boncour, 18 May 1926, DPCDC, Series II (Geneva, 1 Aug. 1926),
LNP 1926.IX.7, 11, 13.
65 Minute by Kirkpatrick, 12 March 1927, TNA, FO 371/12662, W2482/61/98.
66 Report by Salisbury, 22 March 1929, TNA, CAB 24/202, CP 91(29); memo by Massigli, 14 May
1929, MAE, SDN, 856, fos. 208–16.
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Germany – and no amount of personal amity or co-operation established over years
of close interaction could overcome the more important pragmatic needs of national
interest. On the contrary, the talks sparked off antagonisms which affected the final
product. Cecil and Bernstorff repeatedly clashed during the fierce debates, to the
satisfaction of Massigli, who strove to make common cause with the British delegate.
Cecil reported that ‘I have become great personal friends with Massigli, who is
certainly delightful to work with. He really is a fair-minded Frenchman, with all
their extreme alertness and intelligence and more than their usual honesty.’67 Whereas
Réquin had been the ubiquitous French representative on disarmament matters for
the initial years of the League’s activities, from the late 1920s onwards that role fell to
Massigli, the head of the Quai d’Orsay’s League of Nations section. He was extremely
pleased with the extent of the ‘solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon representatives’ he
had been able to establish.68 Bernstorff by contrast, a former German ambassador to
Washington and now a Democratic member of the Reichstag, was a man of very
stiff manners who ‘strutted about the halls of the Palais des Nations with a cold
and haughty air’.69 He repeatedly attacked the draft treaty in the commission’s open
sessions as a mere sham, although in private conversation he was more reasonable.70
Cecil considered Bernstorff and the German delegates to be ‘quite incredibly stupid’:
‘I would have gladly worked with them if they had even once put forward any proposal
which they really believed would be adopted and would make for disarmament,
but they have done nothing but make more or less dishonest demagogic speeches
explaining how badly they are being treated.’71 On almost all the contentious issues,
Cecil and Massigli voted together against the positions defended by Bernstorff. Cecil
was willing to accept compromises and imperfect provisions in order to ensure that the
World Disarmament Conference was actually convened at last. Personally affronted
by Bernstorff’s obstructionism, he responded by linking with the French in taking a
hard line towards German demands. The treaty which resulted was not one likely to
command easy approval at the disarmament conference itself.72
The World Disarmament Conference opened at last with the representatives of
fifty-nine nations gathering on the grey Geneva day of 2 February 1932. Six commis-
sions were quickly created to deal with various aspects of the question, with at their
heads key experts from the previous decade of League efforts.73 Perhaps the most
67 Cecil (Geneva) to Noel-Baker, 25 Nov. 1930, BL, Cecil papers, Add. Mss. 51107, fo. 143.
68 Massigli (Geneva) to Quai, 27 Nov. 1930, MAE, série Y, 516, fos. 199–207.
69 Geneviève Tabouis, They Called Me Cassandra (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942), 67.
70 Speech by Bernstorff, 13 Nov. 1930, DPCDC, Series X, 88; J. Bernstorff, The Memoirs of Count
Bernstorff (London: Heinemann, 1936), 313–15; Cecil (Geneva) to Henderson, 4 Dec. 1930, TNA,
FO 371/14970, W13289/31/98.
71 Cecil (Geneva) to Gilbert Murray, 29 Nov. 1930, BL, Cecil papers, Add. Mss. 51132, fos. 122–4. See
also speeches by Cecil, 27 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1930, DPCDC, Series X, 262–3 and 325.
72 DPCDC, ‘Draft Convention’ (Geneva, 9 Dec. 1930), LNP 1930.IX.8.
73 MSLN, XII, 2 (Feb. 1932), 35–8; MSLN, XII, 5 (May 1932), 146–7. The commissions were: Political,
chaired by Arthur Henderson (Britain, conference president) with Nicolas Politis (Greece) as vice-
chairman and Edouard Beneš (Czechoslovakia) as rapporteur; Military, chaired by Enrique Buero
(Uruguay); Naval, chaired by Eric Colban (Norway, former head of the Secretariat’s Disarmament
Section); Air, chaired by Salvador de Madariaga (Spain, former head of the Secretariat’s Disarmament
Section), with Christian Lange (Norway) as rapporteur; National Defence Expenditure, chaired by
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notable absence was Cecil, who had declined to serve as a British delegate to the
conference because of his unhappiness with the policy proposals of the National
Government.74 Yet despite the apparent plethora of the usual faces, in the opening
stages of the conference it was the leading politicians from the various governments,
including some who had never come to Geneva before, who dominated proceedings.
Many of the long-serving experts from the Third Committee and Preparatory
Commission were still present, attached to their country’s delegation, but they were
now swamped by the influx of new politicians, diplomats and soldiers seeking to
protect the interests of their respective state or indeed armed service. Most of the
more important states were represented in the first months by their prime ministers
or foreign ministers. The question of national armaments was too important to do
otherwise. As Samuel Hoare, a Cabinet member in the British National Government,
recalled, ‘From 1931 to 1935, there was scarcely a meeting of the Cabinet or the
Committee of Imperial Defence in which disarmament was not discussed in one
form or another.’75 The result for the conference of this focus on individual national
concerns was, as might have been predicted, stalemate. This often took the form
of a relentless descent into trivialities. Britain’s representative on the conference’s
military commission, Lord Stanhope, the under-secretary of state for war, wrote to
his prime minister in late May 1932 that ‘our committee on guns spent 2 hours in
discussing whether we were justified in discussing a subject they had been talking
about for 2 days’.76 By mid-June 1932, the British foreign secretary despaired that the
conference ‘has been living for weeks on technical experts and it is in danger of dying
from technical experts’.77 Still, it was hardly entirely their fault, as one of the British
military ‘technical experts’ recalled: ‘When the politicians were confronted with an
insoluble problem or wished to waste time, the invariable device was to appoint a
technical committee.’78 Introducing on 20 July a resolution to bring the first session
of the conference to a close, Beneš almost incidentally put his finger on the core
of the problem: political differences were blocking meaningful co-operation among
the delegates of the major states, with matters being decided only by backroom
horse-trading on a basis of strict national interest. The text of the resolution was
a compromise, he said, reached only through ‘the private conversations of certain
Great Powers and the mutual concessions they have made during the last few days’.79
Even into its second year, the conference’s committees saw little real negotiation;
delegates tended simply to stick to their own positions in the face of all arguments.
On the Air Committee, the British minister for air, Lord Londonderry, would
not put forward any constructive proposals and so, in the words of the unhappy
Augusto de Vasconcellos (Portugal); Special Committee on Effectives, chaired by Louis de Brouckère
(Belgium). Thanassis Aghnides, head of the Secretariat’s Disarmament Section, acted as conference
secretary.
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diplomat Alexander Cadogan, ‘could only sit looking rather like a boiled owl’.80
The disarmament issue was now more highly politicised than it had ever been. This
was not solely to do with the accession to power of Hitler in Germany in January
1933. Disarmament had from mid-1932 replaced reparations as the key issue dividing
France and Germany, and this in fact changed the very nature of the question.
Concessions over German disarmament were vital to Berlin to cover their already
ongoing illegal rearmament; confrontation and an absolute refusal of all compromise
followed. As the conference dragged interminably onward and no progress seemed
possible, many of the more prominent figures departed. Left behind, still talking
about many of exactly the same issues, were some of those delegates who had dealt
with disarmament throughout the 1920s. At the meeting on 14 October 1933 which
saw the spectacular withdrawal of Germany from both the disarmament conference
and the League itself, looking on were familiar figures who had sat at meeting after
meeting of the Temporary Mixed Commission, the Committee on Arbitration and
Security, the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and the
Third Committee.81
Even after the final collapse of the World Disarmament Conference in June
1934, attempts continued to be made in Geneva to secure limited arms control
initiatives: on the regulation of the trade in and manufacture of armaments, on
publicising national budgetary expenditure on armaments, and on the creation of
a permanent international disarmament commission. Unsurprisingly, these too met
with no success.82 The executive bureau of the WDC met one last time in May
1937, but only to urge that work continue and to direct the Disarmament Section of
the Secretariat to carry out a survey of existing national policies for controlling the
manufacture of and trade in arms.83 Along with the preparation of the Armaments
Year-Book, this was all the work left for those officials to do. In deference to the
disarmament conference, the Assembly’s Third Committee had not met between
1932 and 1935. When it once again convened at the 1936 Assembly, some of the
same old faces were still in evidence: Nicolas Politis represented Greece and was the
provisional chairman of the WDC following the death of Arthur Henderson in 1935,
while Christian Lange of Norway chaired the committee.84 The following year, with
much the same turnout, once again it was the smaller European powers (Belgium,
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Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) that made a final
effort for the Assembly to achieve some amount of disarmament. It was still hoped
that small steps might serve as a means to restart a wider disarmament process. A
joint resolution introduced by Lange, now far removed from the heady and hopeful
days of the early 1920s when he had won the Nobel Peace Prize and led the charge
for budgetary limits on national armaments, called on League members, as ‘a first
step’ towards the conclusion of a general disarmament agreement, to ‘examine the
possibility of adopting internal measures’ to supervise the manufacture of and trade in
arms.85 Paul-Boncour, still representing France, insisted that the committee recognise
the enormous amounts of technical work that had been accomplished, asserting
against all appearances that ‘the work of the [Disarmament] Conference, however
compromised in its results, had not been useless. It had opened up possibilities, not
only for the future, but also for the present’.86 When the League Council met at the
end of September 1938, in the midst of the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Secretary-
General Joseph Avenol reported that the planned reconvening of the conference’s
executive bureau had been put off due to ‘the political situation’. He felt it better to
postpone indefinitely any further meetings ‘to a more propitious date’.87 It was the
last stitch of the lengthy disarmament thread.
Floating on such tides, the disarmament ‘community’ in Geneva was ultimately
little more than flotsam and jetsam. Certainly the continuity of the various individuals
dealing with disarmament during the inter-war years was remarkable. Figures like
Cecil, Réquin, Paul-Boncour, Massigli, de Marinis, Beneš, Politis and Bernstorff, plus
the Scandinavians, turned up again and again. The mere attendance of representatives
from non-League states, such as the United States, was a demonstration of the power
of an issue such as disarmament to ‘educate’ them in internationalism. But the
unfortunate truth is that they ultimately accomplished very little. The moral authority
of some of them was significant enough that they could never be summarily dismissed,
particularly figures from the smaller powers, such as Lange and Beneš, but the most
powerful and influential delegates were always those who represented the great powers
and they remained wedded to their own strategic concerns. The dedication of the
tiny staff of the Secretariat’s Disarmament Section, the independent spirit of the indi-
viduals on the Temporary Mixed Commission, the determined advocacy of the
smaller states on the Third Committee and even the camaraderie of the soldiers, sailors
and airmen on the Permanent Armaments Commission – all of these incorporated
elements of the transnational dream which Madariaga so proudly proclaimed, yet
none of them could produce the degree of compromise necessary for a functioning
disarmament agreement to emerge. Instead, the imperatives of national interest won
out time and again. The progress to a draft disarmament convention in 1930 did
not spring from the common cause of a transnational community of experts, but
rather came through the intercession of national governments responding to the
external pressure of public demands for progress. The failure of the 1924 Rome
85 OJ, special supplement #169 (1937), 92; OJ, special supplement #172 (1937), 8–11, 15–17.
86 Speech by Paul-Boncour, 23 Sept. 1937, OJ, special supplement #172 (1937), 12–13.
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naval conference and the 1925 Geneva arms traffic conference both testified to the
unwillingness of even the smaller powers to surrender their national interests for the
sake of obtaining disarmament agreement.
In all the disarmament negotiations conducted under the auspices of the League
of Nations, it was thus the individual nation-states that dominated. Yet it must
always be remembered that the League itself was far more than merely incidental
to this process. Indeed, it was the League which supervised, organised and in its
own fashion drove onward the disarmament talks. Without it, the momentum and
imperative to continue any ongoing process of disarmament would likely have expired
long before 1933, when it did in fact effectively perish. Unlike the case of the
economic and financial spheres of the League’s work, experts on disarmament were
not seconded from wherever appeared useful. Rather, with the exception of the
Temporary Mixed Commission, they came only as nominated representatives of
governments, which chose them from manageable groups: the armed forces, the
diplomatic corps and mainstream domestic politics. The rise of the independent
‘expert’ during the inter-war period thus did not give rise to a separate, transnational
voice on the disarmament question. What the League achieved, therefore, was not
the transnational dream of its most committed supporters in the shape of a global
community working for the benefit of all humanity, but rather the creation of
a meaningful and surprisingly effective forum for the conducting of international
business. The inter-war disarmament committees may have left no substantive legacy
of technical expertise, as the post-1945 focus of attention shifted to the new challenges
of atomic arms control, but some of the tasks assigned to the new United Nations
remained the same, such as the collection of information and consideration of the
limitation of national military budgets.
When Cecil addressed the final session of the League Assembly in April 1946
as it handed its tasks over to the new United Nations, it was once again to the
transnational dream that he turned, the vision that had underpinned so many of the
high hopes held out for the League. Cecil cast his mind back to the very first meeting
of the Assembly. ‘I see again the hall crowded with representatives of the different
countries, most of whom were seeing one another for the first time. I remember
it was at the outset rather a chilly audience without any cohesion or corporate life.
Speeches were made and business was done, but it was still merely a collection of
individuals.’ However, he recalled, the business of coming together to think about
and try to act on the problems of the world wrought an incredible change during that
first session, for ‘the spirit of the Assembly changed. It began to live, and what came
to be known as the “atmosphere of Geneva” came into existence.’88 A powerful sense
of international spirit and a real degree of co-operation between nations was indeed
a legacy of the League’s work. But on issues like disarmament, that internationalism
did not transform itself into a true ‘transnational’ community. The ‘atmosphere of
Geneva’ still never induced the delegates charged with carrying it out to forget ‘the
nation whence they came’.
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